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ABSTRACT
This paper will address questions of identity that male Muslim converts in São Paulo, 
Brazil face after adopting Islam. Specifically, it will analyze how they place their religion into 
notions of what it means to be Brazilian. Furthermore, this paper will show how many of these 
converts use Islam as a way to reconstruct their personal identities. Finally, it will argue that by 
becoming Muslims, they embrace a transnational religious identity. This paper will seek to show 
how conversion to Islam in São Paulo can significantly influence how individuals articulate
notions of Brazilian national identity and belonging to the nation.
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1Introduction
The number of people embracing Islam has increased in São Paulo since the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 (9/11) in the United States, which resulted in countless news outlets 
throughout the world focusing more and more on Islam and its followers. Thus, in a quest to 
learn more about Islam and Muslims, many curious individuals have begun undertaking personal 
research. For some, this curiosity has led to religious conversion. Paradoxically, while 
Islamophobia has increased worldwide in the aftermath of 9/11, Islam in Brazil has seen growth 
since then. Although it occurred far beyond the borders of Brazil, 9/11 was a defining moment 
for the Muslims in the country because it spurred discussion on religious extremism and 
plurality, shed light on issues facing Muslims worldwide, and brought more attention to the local 
Muslim communities. As this shows, 9/11 has had an enormous impact on Islam throughout 
Brazil.
Muslims have lived in Brazil since at least the end of the eighteenth, when a large influx 
of African Muslims began to arrive as slaves (Reis 2003). However, the open practice of Islam 
among these newcomers and their descendants decreased significantly in the aftermath of the 
country’s largest slave rebellion in 1835. While people of Arab origin form the majority of 
Brazil’s Muslim population today, many non-Muslims from diverse ethnic and socioeconomic 
backgrounds have chosen Islam as their religion in recent decades, especially after 9/11. These 
converts often find themselves in a position where they must reconcile their notions of Brazilian 
identity with Islam in order for them to relate their new religion with their day-to-day existence.
This paper will address the many questions of identity that male Muslim converts in the 
São Paulo metropolitan area face after adopting Islam. Chapter 1 will ask how these converts 
view their religion in relation to notions of Brazilianness. Specifically, I will analyze how they 
2place Islam within the cultural context of São Paulo and Brazil more generally and how they 
perceive its presence in the country. Chapter 2 will show how many converts in São Paulo use 
Islam as a way to reconstruct their personal identities. I will demonstrate this by describing how 
Afro-Brazilian converts embrace Islam as a way to restore a Muslim identity that their imagined 
ancestors may have once held and how relative isolation from other Muslims affects how 
converts shape their identity. Chapter 3 will show how becoming Muslim allows converts to 
embrace a transnational identity shared by many around the globe. By becoming Muslims, they 
begin to embrace a religious identity that supersedes notions of national identity. By studying 
this particular group of converts, I hope to show how conversion to Islam in São Paulo can 
significantly influence how individuals view notions of Brazilian national identity and belonging 
to the greater Brazilian nation.
São Paulo provides a unique field site found nowhere else in Brazil. The country's 
commercial and financial hub, it has a culturally diverse population that can trace its origins to 
many places throughout the world. This cosmopolitan mix is what many of the Muslims I met 
stated that allowed them to freely practice their religion. “Denis,” a university student, discusses 
the effect the city's diversity on the Muslim community:
Here we have a Japanese neighborhood, a neighborhood of Jews, an Arab neighborhood. So in a 
big city it’s easier to be Muslim here in Brazil here in São Paulo. But if you go to a city in the 
interior of Goiás... [for example] it must be more difficult. You see much more prejudice.1
By showing that various ethnic neighborhoods exist in São Paulo, Denis wants to show that 
Muslims are simply one of many communities in the city and that they can blend in well since 
                                                          
1 Aqui a gente tem um bairro japonês, um bairro de judeus, um bairro árabe. Então em uma cidade grande é mais 
fácil ser muçulmano aqui no Brasil em São Paulo. Mas se você for para uma cidade no interior do Goiás... [por 
exemplo] deve ser muito mas difícil. Você encara muito mais preconceito.
3they live among diverse groups of people. However, he argues that there would be more 
prejudice against Muslims in a small city in a less populous province like Goiás, presumably 
because of the less cosmopolitan atmosphere. Given São Paulo's unique position in Brazil, it 
would come as no surprise if the ways in which the city's Muslims form their identity differ 
significantly from those living elsewhere in the country, especially outside of the South and 
Southeast, which have historically drawn much of the immigrants to Brazil. Local context 
matters significantly—it would be inaccurate to portray identity formation as the same for 
Muslims across the globe. As Aitchison, Hopkins, and Kwan state, “Clearly, geography matters 
to the construction and contestation of Muslim identities, and this collection exemplifies this 
through a series of insights into specific local, regional and national contexts all of which 
emphasise the importance of place and time as significant influences over how Islam is 
experienced, lived out and practiced on an everyday basis” (7-8)
Conversion vs. Reversion
The terms “revertidos” (reverts) and “convertidos” (converts) were both widely used 
among the Muslim community of São Paulo to refer to people who adopted Islam later in life. 
While both terms ultimately refer to a specific group of people, the use of each has profoundly 
different theological implications. By referring to people who adopt Islam as reverts, it is implied 
that they are returning to a previous state in which they were Muslims. Many Muslims believe 
that everyone is born a Muslim but that their religion changes due to their upbringing, education, 
and other social influences, an opinion held by “Yusuf”:
We understand that all people are born with a primordial nature, and this nature is submission to 
the Creator. And beginning with contact with the family and cultural medium you become a 
Christian, a Jew, a Zoroastrian, a Spiritist, or an atheist, you know what I mean? Or nothing—a 
4person who doesn’t have any type of philosophical spiritual parameter. But this happens after birth 
and the upbringing of a child in a non-Islamic environment.2
He argues that all people are born with a primordial nature, which is submission to one God. 
This primordial nature, he implies, is Islam. Therefore, reversion, rather than conversion, allows 
people who become Muslim to return to a stage where they once had a natural inclination to 
worship God. They are reclaiming an identity and religion that they never had the chance to 
embrace. By believing that embracing Islam helps one return to a primordial state, it is implied 
that those who adopt the religion later in life reconstruct an identity that they once had. Unlike 
reversion, conversion implies that someone is adopting a religion that was never a part of their 
spiritual life. Thus, they are not returning to any previous state. The term “convertido” is used far 
more widely than “revertido,” and the terms are often used interchangeably. Because of this, I 
use the word "convert" throughout this paper rather than “revert.”
Methodology
Participant Observation
Participant observation played a vital role in my fieldwork because it gave me firsthand 
insight into the social dynamics of the Muslim community of São Paulo. As a qualitative 
research method, it allows the researcher to become immersed in the community that he or she is 
studying and allows him or her to become active members. Because of this, it is an excellent 
research tool for studying small, scattered populations that may be difficult to reach. As a 
                                                          
2 Nós entendemos que todas pessoas nascem com natureza primodial e essa natureza é submissão ao criador. E a 
partir do contato com a família e com o meio cultural você se torna um cristão, um judeu, um zoroastrista, um 
espírita ou um ateu, entendeu? Ou nada—uma pessoa que não tem nenhum tipo de parâmetro filosófico espiritual. 
Mas isso acontece após do nascimento e crescimento duma criança num meio não islâmico.
5newcomer to Brazil, participant observation allowed me to gain a comprehensive “overview” of 
the local Muslim community.
Participant observation at several of São Paulo’s mosques served as the basis of my 
research. First, it allowed me to observe various religious rituals and the discourses that revolved 
around them. Since I wanted to study identity, it was important for me to see how these rituals 
shaped notions of Muslim identity. Second, participant observation allowed me to observe the 
social interactions that occurred within the local Muslims’ primary places of worship. I was able 
to see how people interacted with one another and what these interactions signified. Third, 
participant observation gave me the opportunity to see how Islam became localized. Despite the 
increasing number of converts from diverse ethnic backgrounds, the majority of Muslims in the 
São Paulo area are of Lebanese origin, and because of this, I was interested in seeing how 
religious leaders and mosque attendees discussed the adaptation of the religion to fit local 
cultural conditions. As these examples show, participant observation gave me significant 
firsthand experience in observing the manifestation of Islam in the city.
Interviews
This paper is based on interviews with eleven converts to Islam who lived in the São 
Paulo area during the time of my fieldwork. While nine of them were born and raised in the state 
of São Paulo, one grew up in the city of Rio de Janeiro but later relocated to the city of São 
Paulo. Another was raised in Lebanon and later migrated to the city. The eleven interviewees 
discussed in my paper self-identified as Muslim and came from families where at least one of the 
parents was nominally Catholic or Protestant. One convert said that although one of his parents 
was Muslim, he did not become Muslim until he was a teenager. My informants were all males, 
6and they ranged in age from their late teens to early sixties. They came from diverse 
socioeconomic backgrounds and held a number of occupations that ranged from university 
students to an English teacher to a filmmaker. In order to protect their identities, I use 
pseudonyms to refer to them throughout the paper. The people that I interviewed represent a 
diverse sample of male converts to Islam in São Paulo. 
I recruited the interviewees using several means. First, they were recruited through the 
social networks that I developed at the local mosques. I informed the people that I met that I was 
conducting a study, and I asked individuals if they would be interested in participating. I 
recruited several people this way. Second, I utilized snowball sampling. A few of the people that 
I recruited for my interviews referred their friends to me, and this helped me gain more 
interviewees. These two methods yielded all of my recruits for the study. Third, I personally 
attempted to recruit individuals recommended by others through e-mails and phone calls. 
However, this method did not yield any recruits, as I did not receive any responses. Meeting 
people face-to-face and developing my networks over the weeks were essential to the success of 
my project.
The interviews, which lasted from 25 minutes to 2 hours, were semi-structured. Given 
that many of the interviews were essentially conversations, the discussions often diverged 
slightly from the original questions, as I let interviewees express themselves in ways in which 
they felt comfortable. I asked a series of predetermined questions (in Portuguese) asking about 
their journey to Islam and how they reconciled their religion with the local cultures. The 
interviews took place in a variety of spaces, including mosques, a café, an apartment, shopping 
centers, and the office of a Muslim organization. The interviewees were given the choice of 
where the interviews would take place, and it may be possible that the locations of the interviews 
7may have affected the discussions held and the answers I received. I quote from my interviewees 
throughout my paper, and all translations from Portuguese to English are my own—the original 
quotes can be found in the footnotes.
Challenges
I had limited interaction with Muslim women throughout the course of my fieldwork for 
various reasons. First, the majority of people attending the mosques were men. Thus, my chances 
of interacting with men were much higher. Second, I did not have the opportunity to meet many 
women at the mosques, as the spaces were heavily gender-segregated. This prevented me from 
interacting with women and learning first-hand about their experiences. Third, I could not recruit 
female interviewees. I recruited most of the male interviewees through the social networks I 
developed, and since I made few female contacts, I had a smaller base from which to begin. 
Furthermore, attempts to contact Muslim women recommended by my male contacts were not 
successful. This may have been due to several factors, including a lack of interest in participating 
in such a study. Because of my limited of interaction with women, my project focused mainly on 
the experiences of men.
Another limitation of my study was its focus on Muslims who considered Islam an 
important part of their lives. Since I had to rely on meeting Muslims through the mosques, I 
tended to meet Muslims who considered themselves as actively practicing and who were actively 
involved in local Muslim community activities. Thus, their interpretation of Islam may have 
differed from Muslims who may not consider themselves as religious, however they define 
religiosity. Furthermore, they may relate their experiences as Muslims living in Brazil in a 
different manner.
8A language barrier existed with some of the immigrants I met, especially with those were 
recent arrivals to Brazil. Arabic is a commonly used language in the Muslim community of São 
Paulo because the majority of Muslims are Arab immigrants and their descendants. Thus, many 
immigrants spoke it among themselves, and since I could not understand their conversations, I 
could not participate in them. Furthermore, speaking Arabic may have given me greater access to 
conversing with people who may have felt more comfortable speaking in their native language. 
Finally, the sermons at the Friday prayers at the mosques were generally in Arabic and were 
accompanied by translations either after or during the sermon (which were simultaneously 
broadcast through special headphones). By knowing Arabic, I would have understood the 
sermons in their original language rather than through seemingly rough translations. Having 
advanced proficiency in Arabic would have helped me significantly in my research.
My Background
My experiences as an American Muslim of Bangladeshi descent living in the United 
States profoundly influenced my decision to carry out this study. As an ethnic minority who 
practiced a different religion and was “visibly different” from the vast majority of my 
elementary, middle school, and high school peers, I have always struggled to make sense of my 
identity. This self-analysis took off especially in the wake of 9/11 when I was a sophomore in 
high school. For the first time I was forced to confront a continuous barrage of anti-Muslim 
rhetoric coming from television, newspapers, magazines, and the Internet. Given that I always 
had considered myself as an American, I could not understand how I—a young Muslim male—
was a threat not only to my own country and but somehow an entire civilization. Since then, I 
have sought to find out how particular groups of people become racialized over time and how 
people within these group internalize or reject this racialization. 9/11 significantly affected 
9Muslim communities worldwide, especially those in Europe and North America, and when I 
studied abroad in Buenos Aires, Argentina as an undergraduate, I realized that it had significant 
repercussions for the communities there as well. My experiences there provided me with a strong 
desire to study the formation of Muslim identity in post-9/11 São Paulo.
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Chapter 1: The Place of Islam in Brazil
A strong belief in the plurality allowed by the multicultural character of Brazil's 
population exists among many of the Muslim converts I met. Although they acknowledged the 
dominance of Christianity in Brazil, many of them believed that the diversity of the country’s 
people allowed for the insertion of Islam into notions of national identity to varying degrees. 
They argued that since the population derives from a wide variety of ethnic and national 
backgrounds, one cannot easily define the "typical" Brazilian. In a country that is home to people 
who have roots across the world, the task of defining a common national identity is quite a 
challenge. Yusuf argues that this very diversity has resulted in significant tolerance for Islam:
We don’t exactly have a single origin. We were formed from various peoples. There are a lot of 
blacks here in Brazil. In the Southeast you find a lot of descendants of Arabs or Spaniards who 
brought a few [cultural] things from the Moors. Italians too… So there’s a tolerance for Islam 
that’s more open than in other countries. Truthfully, in Brazil there’s a tolerance with whatever 
that everyone can be anything they want. No one is really worried about that. There isn’t a 
national identity to put over another identity. When you put one over another identity what you 
have to have is your own previous identity. Brazilians don’t have this previous identity. So it’s a 
very cosmopolitan thing.3
By explaining that Brazil’s people come from diverse origins, Yusuf holds the position that the 
cultural diversity that exists within the country easily allows for the inclusion of Islam. In other 
words, he believes that no overarching national identity exists because of the many types of 
people who have lived in Brazil throughout its history. Furthermore, he argues that there is more 
                                                          
3 A gente não teve exatamente uma origem única. Fomos formados de vários povos. [...] Existem muitos negros aqui 
no Brasil. No Sudeste você encontra muitos descendentes de árabes ou de espanhóis que já trouxeram um pouco das 
coisas dos mouros. Italianos também... Então existe uma tolerância com o Islã que é mais aberto que em outros 
países. Na verdade no Brasil existe uma tolerância com qualquer coisa que todo mundo pode ser o que quiser... 
Ninguém está realmente preocupado com isso. Não existe uma identidade nacional para repor uma outra identidade. 
Quando você repõe outra identidade você tem que ter uma idenidade anterior própria. O brasileiro não tem esta 
identidade anterior própria... Então é uma coisa extremamente cosmopolita.
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tolerance for Islam in Brazil than in other countries because of this very diversity. Denis argues 
that Islam is compatible with Brazilian culture:
Islam is compatible with Brazilian culture… What’s Brazilian culture? It’s a combination of signs 
of ideologies and ways of thinking that the Brazilian people have had throughout our history, 
which is very recent. We only have about 500 years of history since discovery. If you analyzed it 
from the time of the monarchy to the republic it’s a little more than 200. It’s a young people.4
According to him, Brazilian culture is a mix of ideologies and ways of thinking that have 
developed relatively recently in history. This newness implies that it is still subject to change and 
is open to further influences. As a result, Islam can fit into existing notions of Brazilian culture. 
The view that Brazil’s diversity allows for great flexibility in the acceptance of many types of 
people into the Brazilian mosaic starkly contrasts with the prevailing elite notions of Brazilian 
national identity of the past that idealized a whiter, more European Brazil. Thus, according to 
this argument, someone could define themselves as both Brazilian and Muslim without 
contradicting particular ideas of national identity.
Shift to Multiculturalism
The policy of whitening—introduced in the aftermath of abolition in 1888—deemed who 
was an ideal citizen and who was not (Skidmore 2005). Because policymakers wanted to alter 
the image of Brazil to that of a more European country, it was in their interest to enact policies 
that favored the entrance of white Christian immigrants from Europe. In other words, a "white" 
Brazil was an ideal Brazil. Dark skin posed a threat to the elites in that it represented 
backwardness. White skin, to them, represented progress and modernity. Through these 
                                                          
4 O Islã é compatível com cultura brasileira... O que é cultura brasileira? Ela é um agrupamento de signos de 
ideologias e pensamentos que o povo brasileiro teve ao longo da nossa história que é muito recente. Nós temos 
apenas 500 e poucos anos de história desde o descrobimento. Se você for analizar desde a monarquia até a república 
são pouco mais de 200. É um povo jovem.
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immigration preferences, it was clear that white Christian immigrants from Europe would 
receive favorable treatment over other types of immigrants who entered Brazil in large numbers 
during this time period, such as Arabs and Japanese (Lesser, 1999). Because white immigrants 
were considered ideal, they could more easily assume a Brazilian identity and appear to 
contribute more to the nation. Other immigrants, such as the Japanese and Arabs, faced more 
difficulty in embracing a Brazilian identity and were perceived as more foreign because they 
were not considered the most desirable immigrants. The immigration policies of this time period 
stated which kind of people were desirable and which ones were not. Arab immigrants in general 
were considered culturally inferior and alien because of their perceived differences, and because 
most Muslim immigrants at this time were Arab, it is not difficult to imagine how they did not fit 
the characteristics of an ideal immigrant conceived by political and intellectual elites. Lesser 
says:
While 'whiteness' had always been a critical component of the definition of a desirable immigrant, 
by 1930 the definition of whiteness had increasingly narrowed to include those who were 
Christian, European and willing to settle in rural areas. Arabs and Jews, two groups that fell 
outside of the desirable categories were a particular challenge because, while not banned from 
entering Brazil, they were never expected to migrate there (Lesser 1998: 40)
Thus, according to Lesser, to be deemed white during this time period by policymakers required 
the possession of certain cultural characteristics, including identification with a particular 
religion—Christianity. This implies that Arab Muslims could not be considered as white because 
of their different religion and origins outside of Europe. Because of this, one could guess that 
they would be considered as less Brazilian than European Christians in the eyes of policymakers 
and other elites.   
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By the end of the 1930s, immigration to Brazil became highly selective under Getúlio 
Vargas' nationalist government. The ruling regime issued orders that at times excluded people 
from many parts of the world, including Jews, Catholics, Hindus, Muslims, Europeans, U.S. 
citizens, and Middle Easterners (Lesser 1994: 25). A nativist sentiment grew among segments of 
the urban working and middle class in Brazil, causing a shift in notions of national identity that 
was reflected in the changing immigration policy. Furthermore, the economic uncertainty 
catapulted by the Great Depression led to the perception of immigrants as competitors, 
promoting a tendency to shun supposedly foreign influences to produce an authentic Brazilian 
culture. A number of religious groups viewed as unassimilable were deemed undesirable for 
immigration in the midst of this paranoia. Considering that even the immigration of Catholics 
and Europeans was restricted, it is not difficult to imagine the place of Muslims in discussions 
among policymakers.
Today, most Muslims in Brazil are immigrants or descendants of immigrants from 
Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine who arrived after the end of World War II. Unlike the immigrants 
arriving in previous waves, the new ones found themselves in a society that was quickly 
changing due to industrialization and urbanization (Filho 2007: 2-3). By the 1950s, 
industrialization became the principal method for modernization and economic growth, and, at 
the same time, migration from rural areas to cities increased significantly (Baer 2008: 49, 71). 
Agriculture no longer formed the backbone of the Brazilian economy. Thus, policymakers could 
not realistically expect new immigrants to work in the agricultural industry, as the number of 
jobs in other sectors of the economy was rapidly increasing. Like the earlier Lebanese and Syrian 
immigrants, most Arab Muslims settled in urban areas and engaged in commercial activities, 
easily adapting to the realities of the changing economy. They fit the new image of Brazil as a 
14
rapidly industrializing country no longer reliant on the export of primary products. Rather than 
contradict notions of the ideal immigrant, the more current waves of Arab Muslims are desirable 
in the sense that they participate directly in the capitalist economy.
Although Brazilian state policy today does not explicitly promote Muslim immigration, it 
certainly makes it much easier than in the past since it no longer seeks to whiten the country 
through selective policies. John Karam argues that while state immigration experts criticized 
Christian Syrian-Lebanese immigrants for their tendency to seek spouses in their homelands and 
for not intermarrying with others, Lebanese Muslims today have greater freedom in marrying in 
Lebanon and returning with their spouses to Brazil in the name of family reunification (95-6). 
Previously, in nationalist thinking, the ideal Brazilian was "mixed," but this idea was removed 
from state immigration policy in the late twentieth century.
Until the 1970s, ideologues hoped non-European immigrants would practice exogamy by 
mixing with native-born Brazilians (Karam 2007: 96). However, in 1980-1, immigration policy 
underwent a significant shift and removed references to racial mixture. Instead, it was "given the 
primary task of regulating the flow of people for 'economic productivity.'" This change shows a 
clear difference from previous notions of what the purpose of immigration should be. Rather 
than promoting immigration as a means to whiten the population, policy now hails immigration 
as a means of improving the economy. [Although elites promoted European immigration to 
provide a steady source of labor on coffee plantations in the wake of abolition, the whitening 
component was an undeniably important part of this project (Skidmore 2005: 136-8).] The 
removal of references to racial mixture from immigration policy allows, from the official 
perspective, Muslims to maintain their cultural traditions and to marry among themselves as long 
as they prove beneficial to the economy.
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Tolerance for Islam?
While many of the converts I met believed that Islam was compatible with Brazilian 
culture, some argued that the religion conflicted with many aspects of it. The people who held 
this view believed that the practice of Islam was incompatible with the lifestyles of most 
Brazilians. “Abdallah,” a recent university graduate, gives the following perspective:
Me: Do you think Islam is compatible with Brazilian culture?
Abdallah: Definitely not in many ways. Like I said, it's part of the culture of normal Brazilians. 
I'm not talking about deprived Brazilians, lost Brazilians, Brazilians socially astray--normal 
Brazilians. It's normal to drink beer, among other things. It's normal for Brazilian guys to go out 
with women. It's normal for Brazilian women to go to the night club to dance and have fun. It's 
normal for Brazilians to eat pork at barbeques. And all of these things are incompatible with what 
Islam teaches. So there's a shock, and this shock is something that when you convert, you feel it a 
little until you get a hang of things. It was like that with the Arab people. The Arab people during 
the time of the message's revelation also liked to drink a lot. So the ban against drinking came 
slowly. It came little by little so that a person could transform himself. The convert is like that too. 
He changes the small things. It's a painful process. But in many ways Brazilian culture is 
incompatible with Islamic culture.5
Abdallah believes that the “average” Brazilian engaged in activities that conflicted with the 
values of Islam. If most Brazilians did not live Islamically-acceptable lifestyles, how could they 
integrate Islam into their culture? Abdallah, through his example of the conversion of the Arab 
                                                          
5 Eu: Você acha que o Islam é compatível com a cultura brasileira?
Abdallah: Com certeza em muitos aspectos, não. Porque como eu falei, faz parte da cultura do brasileiro normal. 
Não estou falando do brasileiro depravado, brasileiro perdido, brasileiro socialmente descaminhado—brasileiro 
normal. É normal beber cerveja, entre outras coisas. É normal pra o brasileiro sair com mulheres. É normal pra a 
brasileira ir pra o clube nocturno para dançar e se-divertir. É normal pra o brasileiro comer carne de porco no
churrasco. E todos esses são coisas imcompatíveis com o que Islam ensina. Então existe um choque e esse choque é 
uma coisa que quando você se converte, você sente ele um pouco e demora até você consegue um processo. Assim 
como foi com o povo arabe. O povo árabe na época de revelação da mensagem também gostava muito de bebida. 
Então a proibição da bebida foi vindo paulatinamente. Foi vindo pouco a pouco para que a pessoa pudesse se 
transformar. O convertido é assim também. Ele muda os poucos. É um processo doloroso. Mas em muitos aspectos a 
cultura brasileira é imcomptível com a cultura islâmica.
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people, implies that values of non-Muslims in Brazil could change over time if they adopted 
Islam, although the process of giving up activities such as drinking could be difficult. Thus, his 
story implies that the lifestyles of a people could potentially change. Nonetheless, for some 
converts like Abdallah, Brazilian culture, as a whole, is intrinsically linked to the practice of un-
Islamic activities. “Isa,” a young man in his late teens, takes a similar yet different viewpoint 
regarding the compatibility of Brazilian culture and Islam:
Me: Is it easy to be Muslim and Brazilian at the same time?
Isa: There are a few habits we change, right? Like about touching between a man and a woman. 
Sometimes the way of conversing with someone of another religion because a conflict could 
happen since there's disagreement. And these types of things, right? Being Brazilian and being 
Muslim aren't much different because both have a big heart. 
Me: So you think Islam is compatible with Brazilian culture?
Isa: No. Compatible with the culture? No. But the personality of these people living? Yes. But the 
culture of these people? No. They're completely different.
Me: Why?
Isa: Because Islamic culture involves putting in people the practice of monotheism—worshipping 
one god--while other religions involve a trinity, which is polytheism—worshipping more than one 
god. It's something that doesn't fly.6
                                                          
6 Eu: É facil ser muçulmano e brasileiro ao mesmo tempo?
Isa: Tem certos hábitos que a gente muda, né? Como em relação ao toque [entre] um homem e uma mulher. Às 
vezes o modo de conversar com uma pessoa de outra religião porque pode sair um conflito porque há discordância. 
E essas coisas, né? Ser brasileiro e ser muçulmano não tem muita diferença porque os dois têm um coração enorme.
Eu: Então você acha que o Islam é compatível com a cultura brasileira?
Isa: Não. Compatível com a cultura? Não. Mas as personalidades das pessoas que vivem, sim. Mas a cultura dessas 
pessoas? Não. São totalmente diferente.
Eu: Por quê?
Isa: Porque a cultura islâmica implica colocar nas pessoas a prática de monoteísmo—adorar o Deus único—
enquanto as outras religiões implicam uma trindade que é politeísmo—adorar mais de um deus. É uma coisa que não 
bate.
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He argues that while it is possible to both Brazilian and Muslim, Islam is not compatible with 
Brazilian culture. For him, there is a clear difference between the personalities of people and 
their values. While a non-Muslim Brazilian may have a similar personality to that of a Muslim, 
the former’s culture clashes with Islamic teachings. The converts who hold similar viewpoints to 
those held by Abdallah and Isa appear to define Brazilian culture as a singular entity rather than 
one made up of various cultures and lifestyles. Given the sheer geographical size of Brazil and 
the many types of people who live within it, it seems unrealistic to describe a single overarching 
culture in the country.
Some of the converts I encountered believed that Islam was compatible with Brazilian 
culture because of its historical links to Brazil. Rather than look at the religion as completely 
foreign to their land, they decided to look at how Islam has influenced certain aspects of 
Brazilian culture and society. “José,” a university student, discusses how he believes Islam his 
links to Brazil's distant and more recent past:
Me: Is Islam compatible with Brazilian culture?
José: Depending on the place, yes. In some parts of Brazil, like in the Northeast, you have a very 
strong tradition with the African religions. In these places, historically, there was also an Islamic 
influence from slaves. There was a slave revolt in the 18th century that was the Malê Revolt. Brazil 
is a country with very large cultural miscegenation. So you can observe many things of Islam on 
top of Brazilian culture […] In some places in Brazil you have a very, very strong Arab influence 
and a Catholic influence from the time of Brazil’s discovery in which both Portugal and Spain 
already had an influence of Moors, Arabs, and Islam.7  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
7 Eu: O Islã é compatível com a cultura brasileira?
José: Dependendo do lugar, sim. Em alguns lugares no Brasil, como no Nordeste, você tem uma tradição muito forte 
com as religiões africanas. Nestes lugares historicamente também teve uma influência islâmica de escravos. Teve 
uma revolta de escravos no século XVIII que foi a Revolta dos Malês. O Brasil é um país com uma miscegenação 
cultural muito grande. Então dá pra você observe muita coisa do Islã por acima da cultura brasileira. [...] Em alguns 
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He sees the presence of African Muslim slaves and the Malê Revolt (which I will discuss in the 
next chapter) as one indicator of Islam's compatibility with Brazilian culture. While he does not 
argue that the religion of these slaves had a strong influence on other people, he does say that 
there is “very large cultural miscegenation” in Brazil, which suggests that some aspects of the 
culture of Muslim slaves mixed with the cultures of others. He also says that there is a very 
strong Arab and Muslim influence that came with the earliest Portuguese settlers, who came 
from a land once dominated by the Moors. Converts such as José take a less superficial approach 
in defining compatibility by looking at the historical presence of Islam in Brazil. 
Portrayals of Muslims in the Brazilian Media
Many of the Muslims—both converts and those raised as Muslims—that I met in São 
Paulo believed that news coverage of Muslims engaging in violence throughout the world was 
the biggest obstacle to the acceptance of Islam in Brazil. Many of the Muslims I encountered in 
São Paulo criticized the negative portrayal of Islam and Muslims on Brazilian television news 
reports, newspapers, and magazines, which they frequently attributed to the influence of the U.S. 
media. José states the following:
We end up consuming a lot of media from abroad. Usually Brazilian newspapers use newspapers 
from abroad. They use [The] Washington Post. They use [The] New York Times or The Guardian. 
They use Le Monde. They use newspapers [from abroad] to base materials. [...] These [Brazilian] 
newspapers end up using discussions that don't have to do with us, you know what I mean? They 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
lugares no Brasil você tem uma influência árabe muito, muito forte e também uma influência católica da época do 
descobrimento do Brasil que foi uma época em que tanto Portugal quanto Espanha ainda tinha influência dos 
mouros, árabes e Islã.
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end up translating a translation that's not merited. This goes on creating stereotypes and images 
that make Islam look like a sick religion.8
In his statement, he argues that U.S. newspapers, as well as those from the United Kingdom and 
France, provide the primary source of information on articles written for Brazilian media 
regarding Muslims and Islam. Brazilian newspapers, in his view, write stories about Muslims 
and their faith using information written by biased sources from abroad. Essentially, they recycle 
information rather than providing their own viewpoints, which José believes produces negative 
stereotypes about Islam. Gianpaolo Baiocchi notes that Brazilian television stations simply 
rebroadcasted images from CNN with only occasional voiceover commentary and no translation 
to Portuguese in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11 (184). This shows that Brazilians viewed the 
same exact broadcasts as Americans, albeit in a less informative form. “João” echoes José’s view 
that foreign media (from the U.S., in this case) shapes how Brazilian’s perceives Islam and its 
practitioners:  
Me: What does it mean to be Muslim in Brazil?
João: I think it's something different from what we're normally used to seeing in Brazil. It's very 
different, and it's difficult for people to accept it because we have a very Western outlook because 
of all the things we're exposed to. Mainly the United States sends us a lot of messages from their 
point of view—not, in reality, Islam. If you ask some Brazilian, he's going to think Muslims are 
terrorists. It's not really that. But the Brazilian people aren't to blame for this because the United 
States imposes many things. I think it's very strong imperialism.9
                                                          
8 A gente acaba consumindo muita mídia da fora. Geralmente os jornais brasileiros usam jornais da fora. Usam 
[The] Washington Post. Usam [The] New York Times ou The Guardian. Usam Le Monde. Usam jornais [da fora] 
para basear matérias. [...] Esses jornais [brasileiros] acabam usando discussões que não acabam em nós, entendeu? 
Eles acabam traduzindo uma tradução que não é devida. Isso vai criando estereótipos e imagens que façam que o 
Islã seja uma religião enferma.
9 Eu: O que significa ser muçulmano no Brasil?
João: Eu acho que é uma coisa differente do normal que a gente está acostumada a ver no Brasil. É muito differente 
e é difícil as pessoas aceitar porque a gente tem muita visão occidental porque todas as coisas passam pra a gente. 
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Rather than blaming Brazilians for creating the image of Muslims as terrorists, he traces the 
source for this type of stereotyping to the U.S—a sentiment I encountered often during my 
fieldwork. Similarly, Silvia Montenegro argues that the media is one of the most important 
agents that create the image of the Muslim in Brazil (64). The Muslims I met in São Paulo 
frequently mentioned this while commenting that the media rather than Muslims themselves had 
more power in defining Islam and its followers. Thus, they implied that they had limited agency 
portraying a more accurate description of their religion and culture to non-Muslims in Brazil, 
which they believed they needed to overcome.
Muslims in Brazil constantly face a barrage of negative portrayals of Muslims in the 
media, as reports of bombings and images of stern bearded men and headscarf–clad women 
dominate. Because unflattering stories about Muslims appear far more frequently than not, 
Muslims in Brazil are forced to deal with challenging the negative ideas of Islam promoted by 
various news sources. Given their small population size and lack of adequate representation in 
positions of power, it is difficult for them to promote a more positive and accurate view of their 
cultures. Many of the Muslims I met said that the popular representations of Muslims in the 
media do not accurately reflect the majority of Muslims, whom they argue are overwhelmingly 
against extremism and violence. Since the image of Muslims as violent extremists dominates, 
many of the Muslims I met believed that Muslims must personally challenge prevailing views by 
teaching others about the true meanings of Islam. Although they might not be able to change 
how Muslims are presented in the media, they believed that they could try changing views on a 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Principalmente os Estados Unidos passam muita mensagem para a gente o ponto de vista deles—não, na verdade, o 
Islã. Se você pergunta para algun brasileiro, vai achar que muçulmano é  terrorista. Na verdade não é isso. Mas o 
povo brasileiro não tem culpa disso porque muitas coisas os Estados Unidos impõem. Eu acho imperialismo muito 
forte.
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much smaller scale. By attempting to correct the negative portrayal of Muslims, they are 
reaffirming their own identities as peaceful moderates.
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Chapter 2: Conversion as a Way to Reconstruct Identity
Many of the converts I interviewed said that they converted to Islam after a search for 
religion. Interestingly, many of them had adopted several religions before deciding on Islam. 
Why this search? According to them, they were looking for a particular truth, and they 
questioned the religious beliefs (or lack thereof) they were exposed to while growing up. I 
noticed a question of identity that involved the soul. Given that no one (presumably) pressured 
them to abandon their former religious identities and convert to Islam, it is clear that they 
adopted a new identity because of their desires. Their adoption of a Muslim identity was a 
creation of their own. This is important because this type of conversion allows one to choose his 
or her own identity rather than to simply follow the identities ascribed to him or her. This gives 
people more agency in determining who they are, and this gives people the ability to construct 
and reconstruct identities. 
There has been a large movement of people leaving the Catholic church and converting to 
Protestant churches in Brazil since the twentieth century (Chesnut 2003; Corten 1999; Garrard-
Burnett and Stoll 1993; Mariz 1994; Martin 1990; Stoll 1990). Interestingly, a number of the 
converts I met said they had joined at least one Protestant church before converting to Islam. In 
fact, many of them viewed the proselytism of these churches as a form of “competition.” Many 
converts compared their efforts to the proselytism of Evangelicals. One told me that Evangelicals 
take much more effort to reach out to the greater public to spread their religion than Muslims. 
This form of competition interested me in that it seemed like a form of marketing to promote one 
religion over another as a way to save peoples’ souls.
Conversion to Islam continues throughout a convert's lifetime, as he or she must 
reconcile his or her beliefs with those of the religion. Oftentimes, these beliefs conflict with the 
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values promoted by Islam, and because of this, the convert may need to decide which ones are 
compatible and which ones are not. Conversion may be a difficult process for some, and as a 
result time may be needed for a convert to feel more comfortable being a Muslim. Karin van 
Nieuwkerk says that:
Conversion does not stop at the moment of embracing Islam, and it is not solely a mental activity 
of accepting a new belief. It requires embodiment of new social and religious practices. Within 
this process of embodiment and learning new practices, new ideas and insights are created that can 
generate new discourses and receptivity to other voices of Islamic discourse. In different periods 
of converts' lives, a revised or novel discourse can make sense (11).
In this she says that conversion is not an instant process. Rather, it is a continuous one that adapts 
to the reality of the converts' circumstances, and they may interpret Islam differently at different 
stages of their life. Thus, being a Muslim may carry different meanings for converts at different 
points of their lives. The experiences that converts have over time may affect how they interpret 
Islam and view religion more generally.
The ways in which these converts reconstructed their identities varied widely, and these 
often depended on their own personal backgrounds and experiences. This chapter will discuss the 
ways of how converting to Islam allows for Afro-Brazilians to reconcile their racial politics, how 
converts reconcile their religious beliefs with those of Arab Muslims, and how converts use 
conversion to Islam as a way to portray themselves in new ways.    
Afro-Brazilians and Conversion
The first Muslims to arrive in Brazil in large numbers were slaves brought from West 
Africa. Known as Malês, they came from various regions and spoke a number of languages. 
Despite these differences, a common religion helped bind them, and it was this unity that helped 
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them revolt against white rule in Salvador, Bahia in 1835 (Lovejoy 2000: 31). Until that point, 
authorities had tolerated Islam among blacks, both freed and enslaved. However, they began to 
repress the practice of both Islam and Candomblé in the aftermath of the rebellion by arresting 
the owners of objects linked to these faiths (Reis 2003: 430). Furthermore, a law requiring slave 
masters to teach slaves about Christianity and to baptize them was passed (499). These efforts 
were meant to weaken not only the African Muslim community but the black community more 
broadly. Although a minority, Muslims formed fifteen to twenty percent of Africans in Salvador 
at the time. For some Afro-Brazilian converts in São Paulo, this history of Islam among Africans 
forcefully brought to Brazil served as one of the reasons they chose to adopt the religion. This 
conversion, in their view, allows them to gain a better sense of their roots and to reconstruct an 
identity that was stripped from their ancestors.
Islam was an influential force in shaping notions of religious identity among Afro-
Brazilians in Bahia at the time of the Malê Revolt. “Muhammad,” a man who grew up in the 
periphery of São Paulo and who describes himself as an Afro-Brazilian, argued that Islam had a 
closer relationship with his personal history than Christianity:
The Malê Revolt served to increase my belief and understanding that my link with Islam is much 
larger than my link to Christianity. Christianity is a religion that was coming from abroad that was 
imposed on the blacks that were captured in Africa. Not Islam. Islam shares space with animist 
and African religions. But Islam is much closer to my reality that Christianity.10
In this quote, Muhammad asserts that the Malê Revolt helped him understand how Islam was 
much more closely linked to the Afro-Brazilian community than Christianity, a religion he 
believes is a foreign one imposed on Brazilians of African descent. According to him, Islam, 
                                                          
10 A Revolta dos Malês serviu para aumentar a minha crença e o meu entendimento que a minha ligação com o Islã e 
muito maior do que a minha ligação com cristianismo. O cristianismo é uma religião que vinha de fora que foi 
imposto aos negros que foram captados d’África. O islamismo, não. O islamismo divide espaço com as religiões 
animistas e africanas. Mas o islamismo está muito mais próximo da minha verdade do que o cristianismo.
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along with animist African religions, has a closer relationship to the Afro-Brazilian experience. 
Thus, by converting to Islam, Muhammad is constructing an identity that his ancestors may have 
once had.
Similarly, converting to Islam is seen by some Afro-Brazilians as a way to reconstruct an 
identity that was stripped from their ancestors. Muhammad further explains how he felt about his 
personal identity before embracing the religion:
Islam arrived in Brazil with slaves and was forcefully taken from our culture by the imposition of 
a new Christian religion. […] I was born without knowing who I was. I was boring without 
knowing my real identity. I was raised without knowing my real identity. So Islam began to fade 
away from me, which always existed within me.11
He says that before becoming Muslim, he had a weak sense of identity. Because his ancestors 
were forced to convert to Christianity, they lost aspects of their own culture. This, he implies, 
was a way to remove their identities from them. He argues that Islam always existed in him but 
that it revealed itself later in his life when he became a Muslim. Or rather, he believes that he had 
a latent Muslim identity within him that came as a result of his ancestors.
A notion among some Afro-Brazilian converts I met was that Islam elevated the position 
of blacks both socially and economically. Muhammad says:
Many black Muslims, when they revert to Islam, end up bettering their self-esteem. [...] Many 
black Muslims end up ascending [socially and economically] even better than his own 
companions—also black—that didn’t have access to the knowledge of Islam. Islam is not only an 
ideology. It’s much stronger when you notice that information will give you your freedom. And 
there the Muslim—whether he’s black or of another ethnicity—starts to find this in all fields. He 
                                                          
11 O islamismo chegou no Brasil com os escravos e forçosamente foi retirado da nossa cultura por imposição de uma 
nova religião cristã. [...] Eu nasci sem saber quem eu era. Eu nasci sem conhecer minha real identidade. Eu cresci 
sem conhecer minha real identidade. Então eu passei a sumir o islamismo, que sempre existiu em mim...
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starts to find knowledge in physics, in mathematics, in anthropology, in the social sciences, in 
whatever.12
Here he claims that converts—both blacks and non-blacks—raise their self-esteem by converting 
to Islam. Presumably, he means they do this by gaining knowledge. Muhammad began seeking a 
college degree when he was well into his 30s, after he converted to Islam. Furthermore, he 
argues that Muslims begin a search for knowledge that allows them to raise their position in 
society. By gaining an education, in his view, people gain their liberty—a point that should be 
noted because of his belief that many Afro-Brazilians live a marginal existence. In her study on 
how certain segments of the poor in Brazil cope with poverty by joining Pentecostal churches, 
Cecília Loreto Mariz argues that religious conversion gives converts the opportunity to 
"rationalize" their spirituality, which may ultimately help with deal with material survival: 
When the Brazilian poor go to a Pentecostal church, they are not looking for an enchanted religion 
with magic, miracles, and emotion, as perhaps middle-class people do, because they already have 
had magic, miracles, and emotion in their previous religions. It seems that the relative 
rationalization of the Pentecostal worldview is most appealing for the poor. Although it does not 
imply that emotion, magical elements, and rituals are decreasing or being suppressed, 
Pentecostalism is still rationalizing, since it introduces a universal ethic and stresses individual 
choice of religion, exclusivity of religious identity, and the construction of a theoretical system 
that integrates religious beliefs. This trend is related to the industrialization and modernization of 
Brazilian society, which has become increasingly global in its values and attitudes. But it also 
reflects the reaction of the poor, who are trying to control these changes and create a better life for 
themselves and their families (8).
                                                          
12 Muitos muçulmanos negros, quando se revertem ao Islamismo,  acabam melhorando seu auto-estima. [...] Muitos 
muçulmanos negros acabam ascendendo [socialmente e economicamente] até melhor do aquele companhero dele—
negro também—que não teve acesso ao conhecimento do Islã. O Islã não é só uma ideologia. É muito mais forte 
quando você  percebe que na informação é que vai dar sua liberdade. E aí o muçulmano—seja ele é negro ou de 
qualquer etnicidade—começa buscar este conhecimento em todos os campos. Ele começa buscar conhecimento na 
física, na matemática, na antropologia, nas ciências sociais, enfim.
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As this show, conversion to Pentecostalism among the Brazilian poor, who are 
disproportionately of African descent, allows converts to embody new worldviews to help them 
cope with their poverty—a view that meshes closely with Muhammad's belief that Brazilians 
who convert to Islam begin a search for knowledge that ultimately helps them to ascend 
financially and socially. Thus, Islam is seen by many converts as a way to cope with the 
economic reality in which they live. Although they may not have the strength to challenge 
existing power structures, they do have the ability to change their individual circumstances to a 
certain extent by adopting a new religion. However, while statistical data suggests that 
conversion to Pentecostalism in Brazil increases along with the impoverishment of the 
population, it is uncertain if this holds true for conversion to Islam as well (Corten, 1995: 104-
105).
Anthropologist Stephen Selka argues that in Brazil in the 1970s antiracist activists 
"became centrally concerned with what it means to be Afro-Brazilian not simply as a cultural 
issue but for the practical purposes of social mobilization" (12). Candomblé terreiros became 
important places in the black movement that originated in Salvador, Bahia—widely considered 
the center of Afro-Brazilian culture in Brazil—in the 1970s and 1980s. Many activists believed 
that African-derived religion formed the basis "for a shared ethnoreligious and sociopolitical 
identity" (12). Conservative Catholics along with evangelicals—who are mainly of African 
descent in Bahia—have typically opposed the use of Candomblé as a shared Afro-Brazilian 
religion (13). It appears that Afro-Brazilian Muslims like Muhammad see Islam as an African 
religion that has the ability to unite people of African descent in Brazil and to raise their social 
status. By doing so, they are reshaping notions of blackness, which Livio Sansone describes as:
not a racial category fixed in some biological difference, but both a racial and an ethnic identity 
that can be based on a variety of factors: the management of black physical appearance; the use of 
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cultural traits associated with Afro-Brazilian tradition (particularly in religion, music, and cuisine); 
status; or the combination of these factors (12). 
By using this definition of blackness, one can argue that Islam is an Afro-Brazilian religion due 
to its history among blacks in Brazil. Thus, converting to Islam allows Afro-Brazilian converts to 
rearticulate notions of blackness by allowing them to rescue aspects of their ancestral culture.
The notion that converting to Islam would bring people of African descent closer to their 
roots shares similarities with the rise of the Nation of Islam during the Civil Rights Movement in 
the United States, and it was obvious that the Nation of Islam and its most well-known figure, 
Malcolm X, has had a large influence in bringing at least some Afro-Brazilians to Islam. In  his 
study of the Nation of Islam from 1960 to 1975, Edward E. Curtis IV says that in the 1960s 
many members of the group looked toward not only Africa for shaping notions of African 
American identity but to the Islamic world more generally:
These African Americans [members of the Nation of Islam who disagreed with advocates of the 
black consciousness movement] began to map their identities with a view not only toward Africa 
but also toward the Islamic world, toward any place where Muslims had been, including Asia, the
Middle East, and even Latin America. They looked beyond the transatlantic world to form their 
communal identities and created black history narratives that linked the history of black people to 
this history of Islam. Their cognitive map went well beyond the boundaries of what has been 
called the black Atlantic. African American Muslims were not simply creating nationalist 
identities in the 1960s and 1970s; they were also creating transnational identities. They felt 
allegiance not only to the black nation but also a community of Muslims who might be members 
of several different nations. If one wants to understand why some African Americans are attracted 
today to various transnational movements like the Salafiyya and various Sufi or mystical orders, 
one has to understand this pivotal moment, this reorientation of black Americans toward the 
Islamic world and Muslim religionists (Curtis 2006: 9).
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Thus, Islam was an influential force in shaping notions of African American identity for many 
members of the Nation of Islam during the black consciousness movement, and the Nation of 
Islam was instrumental in introducing Islam to thousands of African Americans. Now this notion 
has been carried to Brazil to the Afro-Brazilian populations. While the converts I interviewed 
said that converting to Islam helped them become closer to their African roots, they also took 
pride that Islam connected them to diverse groups of people across the world.
Why are some Afro-Brazilians attracted to Islam? It appears that one reason is that 
conversion allows them the freedom to redefine themselves to make better sense of their position 
in society. The slave trade and the restrictions of slavery forced Africans to give up many aspects 
of their native cultures, and an awareness of this has caused some Afro-Brazilians to go on a 
search for their identity to reconstruct what their ancestors lost. In his study of African American 
Muslim social history in Newark, New Jersey, Michael Nash asks why African Americans have 
been attracted to Islam, suggesting that “the consensus among Muslim American leaders is that 
Islam, and what it has to offer for shaping and re-shaping adherents, has been successful in 
filling a spiritual void in the individual and collective lives of African Americans” (14). While 
Nash does not discuss the situation of Afro-Brazilian Muslims, I would suggest those whom I 
interviewed reflected the notion that Islam fills a spiritual void in them, as their ancestors' 
religions were stripped from them centuries ago. By converting to Islam, they were able to better 
make sense of their lives and situations.
Personal Development of Muslim Identity
The vast majority of the converts I met were the only Muslims in their families. Because 
of this, they often felt a deep disconnect between their own spiritual lives and that of their 
relatives. Unlike those who lived with and came from Muslim families, these converts rarely 
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encountered Muslims in their day-to-day lives—their only physical interaction with Muslims
would be in one of the city’s mosques once or twice a week. Abdallah explains this situation 
through the lens of his own experiences:
The guy that’s a revert here in Brazil is like a lone star because in his day-to-day life he doesn’t 
have contact with other Muslims. At work he doesn’t have contact with Muslims. The mosque is 
far away from his house. [...] So the revert stays very lonely. He has a lot of persistence to manage 
following the religion.13
He asserts that converts feel a strong sense of loneliness due to their isolation from the Muslim 
community. Because they have little interaction with Muslims, it is more difficult for these 
converts to learn more about their religion and to share their experiences with those with whom 
they can relate. Furthermore, this isolation makes it more difficult for them to practice Islam, as 
they may feel that an environment more conducive to their religion would make it easier. 
Abdallah also adds that practicing Islam is difficult for converts:
The Brazilian who manages to follow Islam is a victorious person because there are many 
difficulties. The community is small. The guy doesn’t really live with Muslims day-to-day. He 
only complies with Islam because Allah is watching him—no other Muslim is watching him the 
whole week.14
Given the challenges of practicing Islam in Brazil, the small size of the Muslim community, and 
the lack of daily interaction with Muslims, he argues that someone who is able to follow the 
religion is “very victorious,” which implies that although Muslims can practice their religion 
with few barriers, it is difficult to do so because of the environment. Abdallah also argues that 
                                                          
13 O cara que é revertido aqui no Brasil é como una estrela solitária porque no dia-dia dele ele não tem contato com 
outros muçulmanos. No trabalho ele não tem contato com muçulmano. A mesquita é longe da casa dele. [...] Então o 
revertido fica muito sozinho. Tem muito persistência para conseguir seguir a religião.
14 O brasileiro que consegue seguir o Islã é uma pessoa muito vitorioso porque as dificultades são muitas. A 
comunidade é pequena. O cara realmente não convive com muçulmanos no dia-dia. Ele só cumpre o Islã porque 
Allah ta vendo ele--nenhum outro muçulmano ta vendo ele na semana inteira.
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converts follow Islam only because God is watching them. After all, if they do not see other 
Muslims the entire week, what other reason would they have? As these examples show, the 
construction of a Muslim identity for these converts is often very much a truly personal 
experience.
Many of the Muslims I met throughout the course of my fieldwork said that practicing 
Islam in Brazil was difficult not because of any legal or cultural restrictions on the religion but 
because of the temptations that existed in the day-to-day lives of Muslims. While they are given 
freedom to practice their religion, they are also given the freedom to follow it loosely or abandon 
it completely. “Ali,” a convert in his early 30s, provides valuable insight into what it means to be 
a Muslim in Brazil:
Ali: Being a Muslim in Brazil is a constant struggle.
Me: Why?
Ali: Because you’re not in a Muslim environment. You have various temptations. You’re subject 
to sin all day. It’s very complicated to be Muslim in Brazil. To be a Muslim in Brazil is to be a 
warrior.
Me: Do you think there are benefits to being Muslim in Brazil?
Ali: Many, many. I think that being Muslim in Brazil has more award than in other countries.
Me: Because it’s more difficult to practice here?
Ali: Yes. For the difficulty of practicing in [this] environment. In certain countries that you go to, 
on each block there is a mosque. Not in Brazil. In Brazil it’s very difficult.15
                                                          
15 Ali: Ser muçulmano no Brasil é uma luta constante.
Eu: Por quê?
Ali: Porque você não está no ambiente muçulmano. Você tem várias tentações. Você está sujeito ao pecado todo dia. 
É muito complicado ser muçulmano no Brasil. Ser muçulmano no Brasil é ser um guerrero.
Eu: Você acha que tem benefícios de ser muçulmano no Brasil?
Ali: Muitos, muitos. Eu tenho comigo que ser muculmano no Brasil tem mais recompensa do que outros paises.
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In this conversation Ali asserts that being a Muslim in Brazil is a “constant struggle” because of 
the temptations and sin Muslims are exposed to everyday. For someone who believes Islam 
implicates a strictly regimented lifestyle, living in such an atmosphere poses a major challenge to 
the practice of his faith. Interestingly, he tries to make sense of this difficulty by arguing that 
Muslims living in Brazil will receive greater reward [from God] because of the hardships of 
practicing Islam in such a country. Converts who hold views like Ali's look at their position not 
as a burden but more as a challenge to test their faith. This, I would argue, gives them the 
strength to continue following their religion.
Considering that most of the converts I encountered had little to no interaction with 
Muslims outside of their visits to mosques, to what extent is the creation of a Muslim identity left 
to them? It is likely that their experiences of being one of the few Muslims in their families 
profoundly affect their sense of identity. Unlike people born into Muslim families, they cannot 
retreat to a space where others can relate to their experiences as Muslims in their times away 
from mosques. Thus, this difference in religious beliefs between converts and their relatives 
helps to reinforce a greater sense of Muslim identity, especially among the converts who hold 
their religion to great importance. Furthermore, this relative isolation from the Muslim 
community seems to suggest that converts follow Islam because of their own religious 
convictions rather than pressure from other Muslims, suggesting that their adoption of a Muslim 
identity is certainly a personal choice. The status of converts as a minority within a religious 
minority clearly has large implications on the development of their personal identities.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Eu: Por que é mais difícil praticar aqui?
Ali: Sim, pela dificultade praticar no ambiente. Em certos paises que você vai, em cada esquina tem uma mesquita. 
No Brasil, não. No Brasil é muito difícil.
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Converts and Arab Muslims
A distinction between “Brazilians” and “Arabs” exists within the mosques of São Paulo. 
Generally speaking, within these spaces, the term brasileiros (Brazilians) refers to converts while 
árabes (Arabs) refers to Arab Muslim immigrants and their descendants. Throughout my time in 
the field, I noticed that both terms were used by converts as well as those who come from Arab 
Muslim families. Despite the fact that some Arab Muslim families have lived in Brazil for three 
generations or more, the label of “árabe” still sticks with them, and they are generally not 
referred to as “brasileiros” within the spaces of the mosques. While I could not find a precise 
answer to this, it appears that the terms are used to distinguish between those who were born into 
Muslim families, who are mainly Arab immigrants and their descendants, and those who adopted 
Islam later in life. Given that conversion to Islam has grown significantly since 9/11, perhaps the 
significance of these categories have become stronger as converts become a larger presence in 
São Paulo’s mosques. As a result, the term “brasileiro” as an identity marker has become more 
synonymous with “convertido”/“revertido.”
Many of the converts I met often discussed the relationship between them and Muslims 
of Arab descent, frequently referring to the cultural differences that existed between them. 
Considering that most of these converts come from families who have been in Brazil for many 
more generations than most families of Arab Muslim descent, they often viewed themselves as 
being more “Brazilian.” The Arab immigrants, after all, are more recent arrivals who come with 
their own distinct customs and language. While conducting my fieldwork, it appeared that 
converts, conscious of their status as newcomers to Islam, were inclined to creating a distinct 
identity as “muçulmanos brasileiros” (Brazilian Muslims). Since they come from Brazilian 
families and have difficulty in fully integrating into the Arab Muslim community, this identity 
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serves as a hybrid of multiple markers. By referring to themselves as Brazilian Muslims, 
converts have more ease in reconciling several complex identities.
Choosing Arabic Muslim Names
The majority of the converts I met and interviewed adopted Arabic names after their 
conversion to Islam. While this is not required as part of the conversion process, many of them 
choose to adopt new names to mark their new identities as Muslims. In one way, this marks a 
new slate in their life. Although the converts I met did not legally change their names, their 
"Muslim" names hold much symbolic value for them. One of my informants stated that he 
insisted people call him by his new name because it was part of his identity. Calling him by his 
previous name hinted to the very past he wished to overcome. Furthermore, using their new 
names allows them to better integrate with existing Muslim communities in that their Arabic 
names automatically mark them as Muslims within the mosques. If converts chose to use their 
previous names, it would cause more uncertainty as to whether or not someone would 
immediately recognize them as Muslim. They draw a distinction between their "Brazilian" names 
and their "Muslim" names. What exactly is a Brazilian name? Given that Brazil is made up of 
people of diverse ethnic backgrounds, it is difficult to determine what truly a Brazilian name is. 
However, I interpreted this to mean Portuguese names common in Brazil. By choosing a 
"Muslim" name, converts further construct their new identities as Muslims.
Islam as a Universal Religion
Anyone regardless of their ethnic background can become a Muslim. Because of this, 
many of the Muslims I met, both converts and those born into Muslim families, stated that 
anyone could reconstruct their religious identities by converting to Islam. This is very significant 
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because it implies that converting to Islam, in their view, allows people to clear their past sins 
and begin anew. Of course, conversion does not relieve one of the many identities ascribed to an 
individual over the course of his or her lifetime. However, it allows one to bring a new one into 
play with them. Because of this, many of the converts I met believed that Islam was a viable 
choice as a religion for the Brazilian people. Because Islam is not a religion for a particular 
ethnic group, they argued that Islam could become nativized since it did not require the total 
rejection of local cultures. The adoption of Islam, then, allows for the adoption of new identities 
that did not exist before. 
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Chapter 3: A Transnational Muslim Identity
Many of the Muslims that I met in São Paulo praised the universality of Islam. To them, 
being a Muslim in Brazil was the same as being a Muslim anywhere else—at least at the spiritual 
level. Despite the differences in interpretations, they argued that Muslims everywhere were 
united by the core principals of Islam, such as the belief in one God and in Muhammad as the 
final messenger. “Peter” echoes this widely-held viewpoint:
Being Muslim in Brazil has the same meaning of being Muslim in any other part of the world 
because a Muslim in any part of the world is Muslim. There are rules. There is the religion.16
He argues that rules of Islam, however he interprets them, create the framework that provides the 
basis for a universal Muslim identity. Islam, for people who hold such a view, is a universal and 
timeless religion. Similarly, Bilal, a convert in his early 60s, states that Islam is compatible not 
only with Brazilian cultures but all cultures:
Islam is not only compatible with Brazilian culture but all cultures because Islam is the last 
constitution that was sent to Earth. So there’s no way of it being incompatible with something. 
Islam came from Paradise. Allah has written that on the stones that he has there… And he just 
transmitted it through the angel Gabriel to Earth, so there aren’t ways of it being incompatible.17
In this quote, he argues that Islam is the last constitution sent to earth from God. Essentially, it is 
a guide of divine origin meant for all living things. Through this example, it is clear that this 
universality allows for Islam to have a transnational component to it. By embracing a 
transnational Muslim identity rather than a country-specific or regional one, the Muslims of São 
Paulo connect themselves to Muslims worldwide.
                                                          
16 Ser muçulmano no Brasil tem o mesmo significado de ser muçulmano em qualquer outro lugar no mundo porque 
o muçulmano em qualquer lugar no mundo é muçulmano. Tem as regras. Tem a religião.
17 O Islã não é só compatível com cultura brasileira como todas as culturas porque o Islã é a última constituição que 
foi mandada para a terra. Então não tem jeito dela ser imcompatível com alguma coisa. O Islã veio do Paraíso. Allah 
tem escrito isso lá nas pedras que ele tem... E ele só o transmitiu através do anjo Gabriel para a Terra, então não tem 
meios de ser imcompatível.
37
Upon becoming Muslims, converts join a large community of coreligionists that exists 
across the world. Their conversion to Islam allows them to feel like they share a set of values and 
experiences with Muslims living in other places. Because of this, they often feel a sense of 
solidarity with the global Muslim community as they see it. Converting to Islam frequently gives 
converts the opportunity to embrace a transnational identity that allows them to place their reality 
within the context of a religious identity that crosses boarders. In this section I will analyze how 
Muslim converts in the city begin to feel a greater sense of feeling part of a transnational 
community by adopting Islam.
Transnationality of Islam
John Bowen describes Islam as a transnational religion not limited by borders. Like 
Christianity, it preaches an intrinsic universality, proclaiming to be a religion for all of mankind 
rather than for a particular group of people (882). Similarly, the message of the Qur’an 
condemned the worship of localized deities in sixth century Arabia in favor a monotheistic, 
transcendent god. This god, from the perspective of Islam, is omnipresent and eternal. 
Furthermore, the centers of Islamic intellectual thought and political authority have shifted 
through the centuries. This is evident by the fact that the capitals of the Caliphate changed over 
time and that the Islamic era began with the migration of the Muslim community from Mecca to 
Medina, although Mecca has remained the holiest city and focal point of Islam throughout 
history. These factors show that Islam is an inherently deterritorialized religion, a fact that many 
of my informants used to argue that a Muslim in Brazil is no different than a Muslim living 
elsewhere. While his or her circumstances may change, Islam remains the same no matter where 
it is practiced.
38
The Hajj is an example of an event that brings Muslims from throughout the word together 
in one place. Besides serving as a religious pilgrimage, it also serves to show the transnationality 
of Muslims throughout the world, and it is symbolic by the way it shows the racial, ethnic, and 
linguistic diversity of the Muslim world. Muslims throughout the world must pray towards 
Mecca, where the Hajj takes place, in their daily prayers. Thus, the location of the Hajj serves as 
a religious focal point for Muslims throughout the world, regardless of their interpretations of 
Islam. Malise Ruthven says:
The Hajj, the most central event in the Islamic calendar, cannot be described as a purely religious 
festival. With so many Muslims gathered together from different parts of the world, it contains a 
political message and the potential for political action. The political ideals of Islam - universal justice 
and equality, regardless of tribe, nation or race - are implicit in the rituals themselves. They are 
performed in the state of ihram, ritual purity, in which all men (and most women) wear the white 
kaffran or seamless shroud which they will keep for their burials, a uniform which removes all 
outward signs of distinction between them (Ruthven 2000: 7).
In this way, the Hajj is symbolic of the entire worldwide Muslim community, and Mecca and the 
Hajj help to create the notion of an imagined community. Muslims come from a diverse range of 
backgrounds, and because of this sheer diversity, the Hajj helps to anchor the entire community 
to a certain place. By becoming Muslims, converts become a part of this imagined community, 
even though they may not have Muslim “ancestry.”
According to Benedict Anderson, the advent of the printing press and the distribution of 
literature helped create imagined communities. To this end, the Qur'an has helped bind Muslims 
worldwide by linking people of many cultural backgrounds through the belief in one text, much 
like how the Bible has connected Christians across time and space. Despite the differences 
among different schools of thought and sects, Muslims believe in the message of the Qur'an as 
the final holy book of God, reciting its chapters in classical Arabic in their daily prayers. 
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Anderson argues that the ummah (the Muslim world) has historically been the result of the 
creation of an imagined community through the use of a written sacred language (13). He says 
"if Maguindanao met Berbers in Mecca, knowing nothing of each other's languages, incapable of 
communicating orally, they nonetheless understood each other's ideographs, because the sacred 
texts they shared existed only in classical Arabic." This example shows that the Qur'an and its 
message have the ability to bind two distinct groups together. He adds that "written Arabic 
functioned... to create a community out of signs, not sounds," implying that simply the 
appearance of the book's text helped create a sense of unity. Based on Anderson's argument, the 
Qur'an helped create the sense of a worldwide Muslim community in the past, although I would 
argue that the book continues to play the same function in modern times. São Paulo's Muslims 
typically asserted the idea that despite the numerous interpretations of Islam that divided them, 
and the people I interviewed all agreed on the divinity and importance of the Qur'an in the 
spiritual lives of Muslims.
Transnationality of São Paulo’s Muslim Community
The Muslims of São Paulo represent a transnational community. To begin with, the 
origins of the community are transnational in nature, considering that most of the Muslims today 
arrived as immigrants or are the descendants of immigrants. Many of them continue to maintain 
contact with friends and family in their countries of origin, and they often take trips to visit them 
and to introduce the younger generations to their ancestral roots. Furthermore, many converts 
first gained an interest in Islam because of its portrayal in the media. The numerous events 
involving Muslims that they witnessed through the medium of television, newspapers, 
magazines, and the Internet, such as the attacks of 9/11 and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict caused 
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them to research the religion. Events taking place thousands of miles away in places they knew 
little about had strong repercussions for them. As Islam becomes more localized, there will be an 
increasing need to embrace a Brazilian identity to allow for the children of immigrants and 
converts to relate their religion to the realities they face on a day-to-day basis.
São Paulo's Muslims may be pressured to embrace a transnational religious identity due 
to their position as a minority religious group in a country where Islam remains relatively hidden. 
Because of this, the city's Muslims frequently look towards countries with large Muslim 
populations as a source of inspiration. For them there is strength in numbers by embracing a 
transnational identity. By limiting themselves to a distinctly Brazilian Muslim identity, they 
symbolically set themselves apart from other Muslims. However, by embracing a broader 
identity, they can tap into the billion-strong worldwide Muslim community. Furthermore, this 
transnational identity recognizes the international component of the Muslims in São Paulo, who 
are mainly immigrants or children of immigrants. If Islam was brought from overseas, then, of 
course, the very nature of the community is transnational. Of course, this transnationalism is not 
limited to Brazil's Muslim population, as modern Brazil is the creation of globalization and 
transnationalism.
There is a strong political component as to how many of São Paulo's Muslims embrace a 
transnational Muslim identity. Many of my informants expressed solidarity with Muslims 
worldwide, especially those living in lands under foreign military occupation. By viewing their 
coreligionists as brothers and sisters, they place the notion of a Muslim identity at a transnational 
level. Because my informants viewed their religion as universal and transnational, they had 
further reason to sympathize with Muslim causes worldwide. By sympathizing with other people 
practicing (or at least identifying with) the same religion, they were able to relate their own 
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existence with that of Muslims in other parts of the world. Muslims in Brazil live as a minority, 
and their religion is a mystery to many people. Because of this, my informants took comfort in 
relating to Muslim populations worldwide.
Muslim Identity as a Prominent Identity
Oswaldo Truzzi argues that Arab Muslims in Brazil tend to place their religious identity 
over their ethnic identity more than their Arab Christian counterparts (67). During the course of 
my fieldwork, I noticed this tendency among many members of the Muslim community of São 
Paulo—both Arabs  and non-Arabs. The notion of a Muslim identity that transcends borders is 
not unique to Muslims in the city, as Islam is a transnational religion that allows its followers to 
practice it anywhere. The notion of placing one's religious identity in importance over his or her 
other identities does not mean a total negation or disregard for them. Rather, it implies that Islam 
places such a significant role in that person's life that other factors, such as ethnicity and 
nationality, dwarf it.
The tendency for many practicing Muslims in the São Paulo area to place greater 
importance on their religious identity shows the place it has in their lives. This does not mean 
that they negate the importance of their other forms of identity. Instead, it shows that they choose 
to embrace an identity that allows them to join a "community" of over a billion people 
worldwide. Many of my informants believed that because the rules of Islam were universal, 
Islam transcended national boundaries and can exist in any society. Yusuf argues that "the whole 
world is a mosque":
The Creator of the universe is everywhere. A mosque isn’t necessary for a Muslim to pray. A 
Muslim can pray anywhere on the planet. Both in the Sahara Desert and Paulista Avenue or on 
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Fifth Avenue in New York or in the Coliseum in Rome—wherever. The whole world is a mosque, 
as the Prophet used to say. You can pray anywhere.18  
He suggests that because God is everywhere, it is not necessary for a Muslim to go to a mosque 
to pray and that a Muslim could worship Him anywhere in the world. In this way he shows that 
Islam is a geographically decentralized religion and that a Muslim identity could be embraced 
anywhere. This transnational identity allows Brazil's Muslims to join a much larger imagined 
community and thus embrace a more inclusive identity.
Transnationality of Muslim Organizations
Peres de Oliveira says that the São Paulo metropolitan area is home to 40% of Brazil's 
Muslims and that the Muslims in the area have a large number of Muslim institutions (7). 
Furthermore, they have "many contacts with the Islamic world and access to capital to finance 
their activities, more so than most of the Brazilian communities." This puts the Muslims of São 
Paulo at an advantage over their counterparts in other parts of Brazil who may have more limited 
resources. In addition, many of the Muslim institutions in São Paulo receive their funding from 
international organizations, which are mainly headquartered in Saudi Arabia, although local 
Muslims fund their activities through their own donations as well. The reliance on funding from 
overseas sources shows that the Muslims of São Paulo are also connected to Muslims in other 
countries because of their financial needs. Interestingly, the emphasis on a transnational Muslim 
identity allows them to tap into the resources of Muslim organizations, both governmental and 
nongovernmental, from abroad.
                                                          
18 O criador do universo está em todos lugares. Não é necessário uma mesquita para um muçulmano rezar. Um 
muçulmano pode rezar em qualquer lugar do planeta. Tanto no Deserto do Saara quanto na Aveninda Paulista ou na 
Quinta Avenida em Novo Iorque ou no Coliseu em Roma—em qualquer lugar. A terra inteira é uma mesquita como 
o Profeta já dizia. Você pode rezar em qualquer lugar.
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The Ummah
Instead of thinking of one interpretation of the ummah, it is better to think of multiple. 
The concept of a worldwide Muslim community varied widely among the people I interviewed. 
What is the ummah to them, what does it signify, and where does it exist? Gary Blunt suggests 
that multiple concepts of the ummah exist in cyberspace:
I would suggest that, rather than a single ummah idealized as a classical Islamic concept, in fact 
there are numerous parallel ummah frameworks operating in cyberspace, reflecting diverse notions 
of the concepts of community. This reflects online conceptualizations of Muslim identity and 
authority that mirror similar ideas in the nondigital world but which can also nurture new networks 
of understandings in cyberspace. It is a natural phenomenon for a net-literate generation to seek 
out specific truths and affiliations online when they cannot be accessed in the local mosque or 
community context (32)
Blunt suggests that the classical concept of the ummah has shifted to fit the needs of the digital 
world. Because of this, it is easier for Muslims to create various notions of community since they 
can more easily access diverse groups worldwide through the power of the Internet. During the 
course of my fieldwork, I met many Muslims who readily used the Internet in order to learn 
more about Islam and to connect with other Muslims. For the Muslims who had little day-to-day 
interaction with other Muslims, this was very important because it allowed them directly 
communicate with Muslims across Brazil and in other countries. Social networking web sites, 
such as Orkut and Facebook, were one of the primary ways in which they interacted. In addition, 
chat programs, such as MSN Messenger, enabled these Muslims to instantaneously chat with 
other Muslims. Thus, even though many of the converts did not have frequent face-to-face 
interaction with other Muslims, they could at least communicate in the virtual world with others 
who shared the same religion.
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Tablighi Jamaat: A Transnational Movement
The Tablighi Jamaat spiritual reform movement has spread far beyond the borders of 
India, where it originated in 1926, to Muslim communities worldwide. Some members of the 
Muslim community of São Paulo actively participate in the movement, traveling throughout the 
country and abroad to spread the word of Islam to Muslims. Given this interaction between 
Muslims in Brazil, both converts and those raised in Muslim families, and Muslims abroad, it is 
clear that there is a transnational component to the Tablighi Jamaat movement. Despite coming 
from diverse backgrounds, participants in the movement come together for a common purpose: 
spreading the word of Islam to other Muslims to bring them closer to the faith. According to 
Muhammad Khalid Masud: 
The Tablīghī Jamā'at has adopted transnational travel and physical movement as a means of 
Da'wa, and travel appears to have become a characteristic feature of the movement. Reports about 
the gatherings of the Jamā'at in the news media typically carry pictures of Tablīghīs walking along 
roadsides with bedding on their shoulders or riding the trains in spectacularly large numbers. 
Groups of Tablīghīs knocking at neighborhood doors inviting people to come out to the mosque is 
a common sight in South Asia and in many other places. The most important and frequent activity 
of an adept of the Jamā'at is going out for God's sake (Masud 2000: xvi).
Travel within countries and across borders helps physically connect many distinct Muslim 
communities together. The trips conducted by members of the São Paulo Muslim community 
help bring together Muslims throughout the country by allowing them to meet one another and 
exchange contact information. Many of the people I met who went on these trips had limited 
interaction with Muslims in their day-to-day lives. Thus, these trips allowed them to expand their 
circle of Muslim friends and become part of a larger transnational community.
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Chapter 4: The Future of Muslim Identity in Brazil
The religious demographics of Brazil have changed significantly in Brazil over the past 
several decades as the percentage of Catholics has decreased. According to the Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, the percentage of Catholics fell from 95.2% of the 
population in 1940 to 73.8% in 2000 (Pierucci 2000: 20). At the same time, the percentage of 
Evangelicals increased from 2.6% to 15.4%, and the percentage of Brazilians who declared "no 
religion" increased from 0.2% to 7.3%. As these data show, the perception of Brazil as an 
overwhelmingly Catholic country will have to adapt to these demographic changes. The decline 
of Catholicism in Brazil is primarily due to conversion to Protestantism as well as to an increase 
in the number of people abandoning religion entirely. Does this change mean that religious 
minorities, including Muslims, will have a greater say in the national narrative in the years to 
come? As the influence of the Catholic Church decreases in Brazil, new issues in discourses 
surrounding national identity will continue to arise. Since fewer Brazilians declare themselves as 
Catholics, this may mean that Catholicism is decreasing as an important marker of Brazilian 
identity. This large-scale remaking of religious identity, a growing awareness and acceptance of 
multiculturalism, and the influence of the media in shaping the image of Muslims will likely 
continue to play an instrumental role in placing Islam into the national narrative in the years to 
come.
Despite the increased discussion about Islam and Muslims in the aftermath of 9/11, the 
Muslim population of Brazil remains relatively hidden from the view of the public. Islam is 
widely perceived as a foreign religion in São Paulo and the rest of the country, even though it has 
existed in Brazil for at least two centuries. Many in the Muslim community, including converts, 
believe that this is because local Muslims have not taken a large-scale, organized effort to 
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educate the rest of the population about their religion and way of life. While many of the 
Muslims I met complained about their relative invisibility, they believed that this could be 
changed over time if Muslims in Brazil were more proactive about showcasing their faith. Given 
that reports about events involving Muslims abroad have increased significantly in the media, it 
is likely that Brazil’s Muslims will receive greater attention over the years, as they are the 
representatives of Islam in the country. However, considering that much of the coverage of 
Muslims involves violent conflicts, the messaged relayed to Brazilian audiences generally has 
not produced favorable images of Islam and its followers. According to Sheren H. Razack, 
“Three allegorical figures have come to dominate the social landscape of the 'war on terror' and 
its ideological underpinning of a clash of civilizations: the dangerous Muslim man, the 
imperilled Muslim woman, and the civilized European, the latter a figure who is seldom 
explicitly named but who nevertheless anchors the first two figures” (5). The former two figures 
seem to be the most widely-viewed ones in the eyes of many of the Muslims I met in São Paulo. 
The practice of Islam will have to be adapted to the social realities of Brazil in order to 
ensure its survival and propagation by future generations of Muslims in the country. Throughout 
the course of my fieldwork, many converts stated that mosque leadership in São Paulo, which is 
mostly dominated by Lebanese immigrants, will have to have a better understanding of local 
cultures to fit the needs of Muslims. These converts argued that Muslim youth must see a 
purpose for Islam. If they do not understand how Islam is relevant for them, they will abandon it. 
Similarly, if non-Muslims view Islam as a foreign faith, they argue, they will not have an interest 
in converting to Islam. Furthermore, many of the converts I met believed that it was important 
for mosque leadership to understand the spiritual needs of converts. Since the vast majority of 
them do not have Muslim relatives, they may have more difficulty in maintaining Islam and may 
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ultimately abandon the religion entirely if they do not find it relevant to their reality. Thus, 
leadership at mosques will have to be aware of these challenges, especially for converts who may 
not have a large Muslim social network. Adapting the practice of Islam to life in Brazil does not 
mean that the core tenets of the faith will have to be compromised. Rather, rather these tenets 
will have to be reconciled with the cultures of the diverse regions of Brazil to flourish and 
continue for generations. 
The future of Islam in São Paulo and maybe even in Brazil more broadly will 
increasingly depend on converts to ensure its growth and propagation, especially since few 
Muslim immigrants continue to come to Brazil. While no reliable statistics on the number of 
converts in São Paulo exist, my interviews and conversations with numerous community 
members indicate that many more converts have adopted Islam since 9/11. Since the convert 
population has grown substantially in the past nine years, it is necessary for the mosques to adapt 
to accommodate for their specific needs. Islam in Brazil has historically been an African and 
Arab religion, and this increase in conversion will continue to shape change the demographics of 
the community.
Islam as an “Arab” Religion
Despite the fact that Islam has existed in Brazil for centuries, it is often perceived as a 
relatively new and exotic religion in the country. For many Brazilians, Islam is an ethnic religion 
confined to a particular sector of the Arab Brazilian community. Peres de Oliveira says that 
"[t]his ethnic or nearly ethnic character is due to the fact that Islam behaves as a religion for an 
ethnic group for which it is a bonding element in the community, that allows it to speak its native 
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language and compose its specific ethnic identity" (4). This implies that Islam and Muslims of 
Arab descent in Brazil are intrinsically related. José discusses this issue:
I see that the Islamic community is sometimes confused a little bit with the Lebanese Brazilian 
community that is very strong here in Brazil, which has the country that has more Lebanese 
outside of Lebanon Because of that, the very image of Islam becomes very stuck with the image of 
the Arab Lebanese community.19
In this quote he says that sometimes the Muslim community is viewed as part of the Lebanese 
community in Brazil. While he recognizes that the majority of Muslims in Brazil are of Lebanese 
origin, he does not view Islam as a strictly Lebanese or Arab religion and wants to separate Islam 
from the image that Islam is an “Arab” religion. Given that the vast majority of Muslims in 
Brazil have Arab ancestry, it should come as no surprise that Islam is so closely tied to the Arab 
community. However, a handful of non-Arab Muslim immigrants do live in Brazil, and the 
number of black, white, and mixed-race converts has increased substantially in recent years, 
especially in São Paulo. Several of the converts that I met believed that the perception of Islam 
as an "Arab" religion hindered its growth in Brazil among non-Muslims. They argued that if 
more Brazilians knew that anyone could adopt Islam—not just Arabs—more people would 
convert to it. Although they attributed part of this perception to the media, they argued that Arab 
Muslims in Brazil have not taken serious effort in teaching non-Muslims about their religion, 
implying that the Muslim community is partially to blame for the misconception that Islam is 
solely an "Arab" religion and not a Brazilian one.
The vast majority of Muslim leaders at the mosques in São Paulo are Arab immigrants, 
and most of the sheikhs of the mosque are immigrants as well. Many of the converts I 
                                                          
19 Eu vejo que a comunidade islâmica brasileira é às vezes confundida um pouco com a comunidade libanesa 
brasileira que é uma comunidade muito forte aqui no Brasil que é o país que mais tem libaneses fora do Líbano. Por 
causa disso, a própria imagem do Islã fica muito grudada com a imagem da comunidade árabe libanesa.
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interviewed complained about the lack of "Brazilian" leadership at the mosques. They argued 
that they did not fully understand Brazilian culture and that "Brazilians" could better deal with 
the Brazilian public and thus better articulate a distinct Brazilian Muslim identity. One of my 
informants argued that there should be more African Muslim leaders to relate to the black masses 
in Brazil, arguing that this was a logical thing to do to spread the religion. By arguing for a 
change in leadership, this implies a change in identity of the leadership. By switching from Arab 
to "Brazilian" leaders, this shows that the Muslim community, in the view of the converts, should 
be localized.
Changing Notion of Muslim Identity
Notions of Muslim identity continue to shift in reaction to a multitude of stimuli both 
within and outside of the Muslim community in São Paulo. Given that the city’s Muslims find 
themselves situated in a country where questions of identity are constantly being debated and 
negotiated, this should come as no surprise. Brazil has a population of nearly 200 million 
inhabitants who come from many ethnic backgrounds and practice a number of religions. Given 
this diversity, the question of identity has been a constant issue. As more and more people 
convert to Islam in Brazil, notions of Muslimness may continue to change. Furthermore, events 
happening outside of Brazil continue to shape Muslim identity in São Paulo. Because 9/11 
brought Islam to the forefront of discussion, many Muslims in Brazil find themselves in a 
position where they must defend their religion from prejudice and misinformation. By 
challenging the notion of Muslims as inherently terrorists and religious extremists, they are 
working to create their own identity by fighting the identity ascribed to them by others. Forms of 
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Muslim identity and their meanings are elastic and are bound to change over the course of 
history.
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